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Abstract
Retailers may enjoy stable cartel rents in their output market through the formation of a buyer
group in their input market. A buyer group allows retailers to credibly commit to increased
input prices, which serve to reduce combined final output to the monopoly level; increased input
costs are then refunded from suppliers to retailers through slotting allowances or rebates. The
stability of such an “implied cartel” depends on the retailers’ incentives to secretly source from
a supplier outside of the buyer group arrangement at lower input prices. Cheating is limited if
retailers sign exclusive dealing or minimum purchase provisions. We discuss the relevancy of our
findings for antitrust policy.
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1 Introduction
Buyer groups are cooperative arrangements between retailers to combine their purchases in input
markets. Such groups are wide-spread, especially in the grocery industry.1 A common rationale
for forming a buyer group is to exercise buyer power (countervailing power) over suppliers, thereby
obtaining more favorable contractual terms, such as lower wholesale prices or increased input quality.
As such, buyer groups have the potential to improve welfare, because lower input prices may be
passed on to consumers.2
This paper abstracts away from countervailing power and monopsony motivations and focuses on
the stability of a strictly anticompetitive rationale behind the formation of buyer groups in wholesale
markets with unobservable contracting. Central sourcing through a buyer group allows retailers to
jointly coordinate on wholesale contracts with increased input prices, thereby increasing retail prices
all the way up to the monopoly level. Increased input costs are then refunded from suppliers to
retailers through slotting allowances, thus allowing retailers to expropriate monopoly profits.3 Since
buyer groups are not per se illegal, this mechanism may be a smart “cartelization” strategy.
Foros and Kind (2008) have demonstrated the workings of such a mechanism in a static environ-
ment.4 In a dynamic environment, however, similar to the stability concerns of a standard output
market cartel, the stability of an anticompetitive buyer group depends on the ability and incentives
of retailers to cheat on the buyer group by secretly signing an additional contract outside of the
anticompetitive arrangement at a lower input price. Such a move allows the deviant retailer to
1See, for example, Dobson and Waterson (1999). Some buyer groups exist within a single market segment such
as the Independent Grocers Association (IGA), which is the world’s largest voluntary supermarket network with
aggregate worldwide retail sales of more than $21 billion per year. Other buyer groups extend across different
markets; for example, Corporate United covers industries as various as health care, chemicals, telecommunications,
defense, and financial services. Its membership employs over 1.2 million people and combined revenues add up to
more than $400 billion.
2Explanations for sources of buyer power include retailers’ capacity to integrate backwards (Katz, 1987), to sponsor
entry upstream (Inderst and Shaffer, 2007), to thwart collusion by suppliers (Snyder, 1996, 1998), to engage in multiple
sourcing (Inderst, 2007), their position as ‘gatekeeper’ retailers (Majumdar, 2006), explanations related to economic
dependancy (OECD, 1998) and buyers’ sophistication (Nordemann, 1995).
3Shaffer (1991) shows that, if wholesale contracts are observable, retailers may increase their profits above anti-
competitive levels without explicit coordination. However, Shaffer’s (1991) strategic effect does not allow profits to
be raised to the full monopoly level, while it relies on wholesale contracting being observable, which may not always
be realistic as wholesale prices are usually not publicly listed and negotiations often take place “behind closed doors”.
4Similar mechanisms can arise through joint ventures and franchising. Our policy discussion in Section 5 discusses
these similarities.
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source cheaper inputs, so as to gain a competitive advantage over its rivals in the output market,
and is therefore a relevant concern for the stability of the anticompetitive mechanism.
We show that commonly observed vertical restraints—exclusivity provisions and minimum pur-
chase clauses—facilitate the stability of the buyer group. These restraints effectively limit the deviant
retailers’ ability to source from suppliers outside of the joint agreement. By including such provisions
in the jointly negotiated wholesale contracts, retailers credibly tie their own hands, which may allow
the buyer group induced monopoly outcome to be stable for all discount factors. Without vertical
restraints, the buyer group arrangement can still induce extraction of cartel rents as long as retailers
are sufficiently patient. We also argue that the buyer group’s stability equals that of standard out-
put market collusion if the ex-ante slotting allowance is instead paid as an ex-post rebate (scheme).
Finally, we note that buyer group specific cost savings increase its anticompetitive stability, while
consumers actually benefit if the pass-on of cost efficiencies outweighs the collusive effect.
We proceed by discussing related literature in Section 2. Section 3 presents the anticompetitive
buyer group arrangement and shows that exclusivity provisions make the “implied cartel” stable for
all discount factors. Section 4 investigates its interaction with minimum purchase clauses and rebate
schemes, and explores the impact of buyer group specific cost efficiencies. Section 6 concludes by
discussing the policy implications of the model.
2 Related Literature
Existing explanations for buyer groups include reducing wholesale prices when facing monopolisti-
cally competitive suppliers (Mathewson and Winter, 1996), ‘managing competition’ in healthcare
markets (Che and Gale, 1997), strategic commitments to buy on the basis of price alone (Dana,
2003), creating a stronger joint bargaining position (Chae and Heidhues, 2004), and allowing for
welfare-enhancing loyalty discounts (Marvel and Yang, 2008). In these papers, the buyer group
explicitly affects the competitive process between suppliers and retailers. In contrast, we abstract
away from buyer power motivations; the main purpose of the buyer group in our model is to facilitate
coordination on the input market that affects the competitive outcome on the output market. Our
work most relates to Foros and Kind (2008) and Piccolo (2010); we discuss the differences in turn.
In a dynamic setting, this paper employs an anticompetitive mechanism similar in spirit to that
outlined by Shaffer (1991). In a static framework, Foros and Kind (2008) show that a buyer group
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may implement Shaffer’s mechanism by making wholesale contracting observable.5 Their focus is
on the welfare effects of slotting allowances used by buyer groups in a one-shot game, while we
focus on the stability of buyer groups using slotting allowances, rebate schemes and other vertical
restraints.6 We examine the stability of an anticompetitive buyer group in a dynamic environment by
constructing an infinitely repeated game similar to models of collusion, while allowing for (i) secret
contracting outside of the buyer group arrangement, and (ii) buyer group specific cost efficiencies.
The buyer group effectively acts as an ‘implicit cartel’ facing a stability issue similar to that of an
output market cartel.
Complementary to our work, Piccolo (2010) studies the impact of wholesale contracting on an
output market cartel and discusses the role of communication between retailers in sustaining such a
cartel. He studies a non-standard cartel program and demonstrates how coordination on the input
market enhances collusion on the output market, while we show how collusion on the input market
alone is sufficient to achieve the monopoly outcome, without firms forming an output cartel and with
wholesale contracts being unobservable. Allowing for exclusive dealing contracts, Piccolo shows that
the joint monopoly outcome can be more easily sustained, but not for all discount factors as is the
case in our model. The reason is that in Piccolo’s model collusion takes place on the output market,
and therefore deviation also takes place on the output market. In contrast, in our model collusion
takes place on the input market, so deviation (on the input market) is fully restricted by exclusive
dealing contracts.
The underlying idea of the Shaffer (1991) effect has its roots in the strategic delegation literature.
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) are the seminal papers, which show that commitment
on a particular incentive scheme for managers allows firms to soften or intensify product market
competition. In the same spirit, Shaffer (1991) shows that commitment on increased wholesale
prices in the input market allows retailers to soften competition on the output market.7 Two
assumptions play a key role in the strategic delegation framework: (i) observability of contracts
5In a setting without a buyer group, Miklós-Thal, Rey and Vergé (2011) show that industry profits can be maximised
when retailers make offers to a single supplier provided that contracts are observable and can be sufficiently complex,
for example through specifying three-part tariffs incorporating conditional fixed payments.
6Dana (2004) also examines the issue of buyer group stability, but in the context of how this impacts on the terms
a group is able to secure from suppliers for its members. Specifically, when members can jointly commit to bundle
their purchases together to buy exclusively from a single seller, they are generally able to secure lower input prices
and hence greater profits than if they are unable to commit in this way.
7While Shaffer (1991) assumes that retailers have full bargaining power, Irmen (1998) assumes that suppliers have
full bargaining power and finds the same result as Shaffer (1991), but with a positive instead of a negative fixed fee.
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and (ii) commitment to contracts. As discussed above, our model does not require observability
of contracts. As for the commitment aspect, Rey and Stiglitz (1995) argue that irreversibility of
wholesale contracts may be a reasonable assumption, since wholesale prices are usually determined
before the price game between retailers takes place; as noted by Foros and Kind (2008), retailers
usually do not engage in long-term contracting with consumers, while wholesale contracts are often
set for longer periods.
Although we abstract away from countervailing power motivations, our work is closely related
to the policy debate surrounding the issue of buyer power, which has been the focus of increased
attention from both practitioners and academics.8 Therefore, Section 6 of the paper discusses the
policy implications of our results, arguing that similar mechanisms are at work with franchising, joint
ventures and resale price maintenance. Our model also relates to the exclusive dealing literature as
we show that vertical restraints tie the hands of retailers and therefore serve as credible commitment
devices for them to adhere to the anticompetitive buyer group arrangement.9
3 Buyer Groups and Exclusive Dealing
In this section, we describe the game and show that slotting allowance contracts negotiated through
buyer groups serve to allow retailers to expropriate the full monopoly rents on the output market.
Exclusive dealing provisions ensure that this outcome is stable for all discount factors.
Players Consider an industry consisting of n identical retailers, sourcing from perfectly competi-
tive price-taking suppliers that produce at constant marginal cost c. We model suppliers as being
perfectly competitive to abstract away from countervailing power and monopsony motivations; that
is, retailers extract all wholesale surplus, independent of the existence of a buyer group.10 The retail-
ers costlessly transform one unit of input into one unit of output, and face continuously differentiable
consumer demand D (p), where D0 (p) < 0.
8Work on buyer power includes, for example, Snyder (1996, 1998), Dobson and Waterson (1997), and Inderst and
Wey (2003, 2007).
9Major works in the exclusive dealing literature include Aghion and Bolton (1987), Rasmusen, Ramseyer and
Wiley (1991), Bernheim and Whinston (1998), Segal and Whinston (2000), Fumagalli and Motta (2006), Simpson
and Wickelgren (2007) and Abito and Wright (2008).
10In Section 5, we argue that buyer power generated through the buyer group actually reinforces our results.
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Timing and actions Retailers have the option to form a buyer group, which means that (i) the
participating retailers jointly offer take-it-or-leave-it wholesale contracts to suppliers, while (ii) they
source their inputs centrally through this buyer group. This allows for monitoring the behavior of
each buyer group member.
Firms interact for an infinite number of periods. Each period consists of three stages:
1. Buyer group stage Retailers each individually decide whether to sign up to a buyer group,
and are able to condition their participation on other retailers joining.
2. Contracting stage If the buyer group is not established in stage 1, retailers independently
and simultaneously offer take-it-or-leave-it contracts to suppliers. If a buyer group is established,
then its members jointly offer take-it-or-leave-it contracts with one or more suppliers with the ob-
jective of maximising the joint profits of the buyer group members.
The buyer group members also have the possibility to (secretly) make take-it-or-leave-it contrac-
tual offers outside of the group arrangement. Contracting takes the form of each retailer i, or the
buyer group on behalf of all retailers, making a take-it-or-leave-it two-part tariff offer to a supplier,
consisting of a linear element wi and a fixed fee element ⌧i. The supplier accepts or rejects the
offer.11
3. Competition stage Given prevailing wholesale contracts, retailers act non-collusively in
their output market; they compete by simultaneously setting either quantities or prices.
Information All contracts negotiated outside of the buyer group arrangement are unobservable
to rival retailers. That is, contracts are private information if (i) no buyer group is established in the
first place, or (ii) a buyer group is established, but a buyer group member decides to negotiate an
additional contract outside of the buyer group arrangement. However, both the contracts negotiated
through the buyer group, and the volume of inputs sourced through the group, are observable to all
buyer group members after the competition stage.12
11Since the upstream industry is perfectly competitive, retailers extract all of the surplus independent of the bar-
gaining framework. That is, we could equally have suppliers making take-it-or-leave-it offers to retailers: equilibrium
contracts would be the same, since suppliers have no bargaining power.
12We take the conservative approach that input volumes through buyer group contracts are observed at the end of
the period. Otherwise, the buyer group would allow for immediate monitoring and punishment of a deviant retailer
within the same period. This would increase buyer group stability and, thus, reinforces our anticompetitive mechanism.
However, the anticompetitive buyer group emerges already solely through the joint writing of “smart” input contracts,
and does not rely on the immediate monitoring of wholesale market activities. We thank an anonymous referee for
this point.
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The game on the output market is characterized by perfect monitoring, i.e., quantities and prices,
are observable by all retailers.
Payoffs If retailer i’s offer is accepted by a supplier, the fixed amount ⌧i is paid immediately after
the contracting stage, while the variable amount qiwi is paid immediately after the competition
stage, where qi is the quantity sourced by retailer i. Payoffs are discounted with factor  .
Given actual prevailing wholesale contracts, we make the following assumptions on each retailer
i’s profit function ⇡i (w, ⌧ ),
@⇡i (w, ⌧ )
@wi
 0, @⇡i (w, ⌧ )
@wj
  0, (1)
@⇡i (w, ⌧ )
@⌧i
< 0,
@⇡i (w, ⌧ )
@⌧j
= 0, 8i, 8j 6= i, (2)
where w = [w1, ..., wn] and ⌧ = [⌧1, ..., ⌧n] are the vectors of linear and fixed elements of actual
prevailing wholesale contracts, respectively. Assumptions (1) guarantee that a retailer’s profit weakly
decreases (increases) with its own (rival’s) variable input costs. Assumptions (2) state that a retailer’s
profits decrease (do not change) with its own (rival’s) fixed input costs. Note that, given prevailing
wholesale contracts, retailers’ competitive behavior on the output market depends on marginal input
costs only, because fixed input costs are sunk.
Equilibrium concept We solve for the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. First,
in the contracting stage we solve for wholesale contracts that maximise the buyer group members’
joint profits when they (Nash) compete in the competition stage. Second, if such a strategy is
unstable due to the threat of buyer group members deviating and secretly sourcing outside of the
buyer group arrangement, we solve for the critical discount factor such that the maximum joint
profit (monopoly profit) is supported by grim-trigger punishment in the form of reversion to Nash
behavior.
We focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which all retailers join the buyer group to collude
on the monopoly outcome. This is conceptually equivalent to standard output market collusion in
which all retailers join the collusive agreement and coordinate on the monopoly outcome, which
is the standard benchmark in the literature on cartels and collusion. This allows us to make a
meaningful comparison between the stability of an “implied cartel” on the input market and the
stability of an output market cartel.
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3.1 No Buyer Group
When none of the retailers sign up to the buyer group, each retailer individually and unobservably
negotiates with perfectly competitive suppliers. Because wholesale contracts are secret, in the con-
tracting stage, each retailer prefers to write a contract with variable costs as low as possible, so
as to secure an optimal competitive position vis-a-vis rival retailers in the competition stage. This
leads to wi = c for every i.13 That is, by setting the linear element at the suppliers’ marginal cost
c, retailers overcome the double marginalisation problem. Each retailer sets the fixed fee at zero,
so as to keep all of the profits, resulting in suppliers earning (perfectly) competitive profits and
each retailer earning competitive profits ⇡c ⌘ ⇡i (wc, ⌧ c) in each period, where wc = [c, ..., c] and
⌧ c = [0, ..., 0], i.e.
(wci , ⌧
c
i ) = (c, 0) ,
for every retailer i 2 {1, ..., n}, where superscript ‘c’ represents the competitive case.
3.2 Fully Stable Buyer Group
Given the set-up of the game, the optimal symmetric strategy to form a buyer group is that retailer
i joins the buyer group in a given period if and only if (i) all rival retailers j 6= i join the buyer group
in that period, (ii) all rival retailers joined the buyer group in all previous periods, and (iii) none of
the rival retailers negotiated contracts outside of the buyer group arrangement in previous periods.
Hence, if not all of these conditions are met, the buyer groups is not formed. This symmetric strategy
ensures that all retailers indeed join the group, because no buyer group is formed when one or more
retailers decide not to join, which would result in competitive profits with contracts (wci , ⌧ ci ) = (c, 0)
as described in the previous subsection.
Suppose that retailers are able to sign contracts containing exclusive dealing clauses, which
specify that retailers may only source through the current contract and are prohibited from sourcing
through alternative suppliers. We assume that such contracts are legally binding and credibly
enforceable, such that breaking the exclusive dealing clause leads to the deviant retailer facing an
expected fine large enough to deter a retailer from such a deviation.
Denote by Qm and pm the retailers’ total monopoly quantity and monopoly price, respectively.
13O’Brien and Shaffer (1992) show that, with unobservable contracting, even a sole supplier making take-it-or-leave-
it offers to retailers may be unable to achieve the vertically integrated joint profit maximizing outcome.
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Proposition 1 All retailers join the buyer group and jointly negotiate the exclusive dealing contract
(wm, ⌧m), where wm and ⌧m are such that, for every retailer i,
qi (w
m) = qm in the case of quantity competition among retailers, or
pi (w
m) = pm in the case of price competition among retailers; and
⌧m =   (wm   c) qm,
where qm = Qm/n and wm = [wm, ..., wm]. This contract allows retailers to jointly extract monopoly
profits, and is stable against deviation for all discount factors.
Proof. The buyer group consists of all retailers, otherwise the group is not formed in the first place
and all retailers would earn competitive profits, as discussed in the first paragraph of Secion 3.2. Its
members negotiates wholesale contracts that maximise their joint profits. With quantity or price
competition, respectively, this is achieved by solving (w, ⌧ ) from
max
(w,⌧ )
nX
i=1
⇡i ((w, ⌧ )) = max
(w,⌧ )
nX
i=1
[qi (w) (p (Q (w))  wi)  ⌧i] , or
max
(w,⌧ )
nX
i=1
⇡i ((w, ⌧ )) = max
(w,⌧ )
nX
i=1
[qi (p (w)) (pi (w)  wi)  ⌧i] ,
such that suppliers do not earn negative profits.
In the case of quantity (price) competition, industry profits are then maximised if wholesale
contracts specify linear elements wm that induce the downstream monopoly output (price). That
is, qi (wm) = Qm/n in case of quantity competition, and pi (wm) = pm in case of price competition,
for every retailer i. The revenue earned by each active supplier from each retailer is refunded via
the fixed fee, ⌧m =   (wm   c) qm. Including an exclusive dealing provision prevents retailers from
deviating by signing an additional contract outside of the buyer group, which makes the arrangement
stable for all discount factors.
The buyer group thus allows retailers to jointly commit to higher wholesale tariffs wm > c,
which dampens competition at the retail level, resulting in joint monopoly profits. The revenue
earned by each active supplier (wm   c) qm from each retailer is refunded through a negative fixed
fee ⌧m, which corresponds to a slotting allowance.14 Since the slotting allowance is a fixed fee, it
14An analysis of slotting allowances is presented in Shaffer (1991) and Marx and Shaffer (2007), who describe the
practice as widespread across many industries, particularly grocery retailing. The Federal Trade Commission (2003)
conducted an analysis of slotting allowances in this industry and found them to be common practice.
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is a contractual sunk cost for the suppliers and a contractual sunk income for the retailers; thus,
its size is independent on the number of inputs sourced and does not affect the retailers’ behavior.
Therefore, this mechanism allows retailers to jointly expropriate monopoly profits by coordinating
through a buyer group on the input market, without engaging in per se illegal collusion in the output
market.
Note that such an outcome is not possible without the presence of the buyer group. Retailers
would then prefer an unobservable wholesale contract specifying a wholesale tariff c, so as to be able
to increase output (or decrease price) at the expense of rivals’ profits. The buyer group serves to
prevent such opportunistic behavior by allowing buyer group members to jointly commit to wholesale
tariff wm. This contract can be with one or several suppliers; the key point is that the contract(s)
is (are) negotiated jointly by all group members.15
Although retailers have all of the bargaining power, they choose to sign exclusive deals that
bind them to their suppliers. This is in contrast with another type of exclusive deal observed in
practice, i.e., one in which retailers use their negotiation power to bind their suppliers solely to
them. Instead, in our model retailers use their bargaining power to tie their own hands. The
intuition is that the exclusive deal serves as a commitment device for retailers to not deviate in the
input market, resulting in the stabilisation of the coordinated input market arrangement. Not only
retailers prefer exclusivity provisions, suppliers also prefer them: the exclusivity provision is a means
of guaranteeing that suppliers can recoup their expenditure on slotting allowances. Without such
a clause, a supplier cannot legally prevent a retailer from sourcing from another supplier outside of
the buyer group arrangement.
An exclusive deal set up by a buyer group may attract the attention of competition authorities.
However, the European Commission’s (EC) guidelines on horizontal cooperation agreements (2001)
recognise that:
"An obligation to buy exclusively through the cooperation can in certain cases be indis-
pensable to achieve the necessary volume for the realisation of economies of scale."
Hence, buyer groups using exclusive deals in their contracts are not necessarily illegal, and can
15More generally, in an infinitely repeated game, one could also think of an anticompetitive mechanism in which
suppliers could develop a reputation of not agreeing with unit wholesale prices lower than wm. Retailers could punish
a supplier giving discounts by not sourcing from that supplier in future periods. As our game models suppliers as
being perfectly competitive, they earn zero profits anyway, and such punishment is irrelevant; the mechanism breaks
down. We thank an anonymous referee for this point.
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actually be falsely defended using the argument that they are required to allow the group to achieve
sufficient scale.
4 Buyer Groups, Minimum Purchase Clauses and Rebate Schemes
We now relax the assumption that retailers are able to sign exclusive deals with suppliers, and exam-
ine the stability of the buyer group arrangement when this is not the case. Instead, we allow contracts
to specify a minimum order size that the retailer in question is legally obliged to purchase from the
relevant supplier. Such minimum purchase provisions are wide-spread; for example, Doucette (1997)
notes that "a key characteristic of a successful GPO [group purchasing organisation] is its ability to
obtain price concessions from suppliers, usually in exchange for some guaranteed minimum purchase
volume by its members." By logical extension of the EC guidelines, minimum purchase provisions
may be permitted by regulators as they may be perceived to be necessary to achieve economies of
scale.
Before moving on to examine the stability of the buyer group arrangement in the presence of
minimum purchase provisions, we determine the stability of a standard output market cartel. This
will serve as a benchmark to which we compare the stability of the buyer group arrangement.
In the case of symmetric output market collusion, each retailer raises price to pm or restricts
quantity to qm, such that they jointly extract monopoly profits ⇡m, with each retailer earning ⇡m/n
per period. Given that all other retailers play the collusive strategy, retailer i may deviate and earn
single-period deviation profit ⇡d by setting qi or pi to solve, respectively,
⇡d ⌘ max
qi
qi
✓
p
✓
n  1
n
Qm + qi
◆
  c
◆
, or (3)
⇡d ⌘ max
pi
qi
 
pi,p
m
 i
 
(pi   c) .
Deviation is observed by rival retailers and induces grim trigger Nash punishment, resulting in
retailers earning competitive profits ⇡c in all future periods. Therefore, collusion is sustained if and
only if the usual incentive compatibility constraint holds,
1X
t=1
 t 1
⇡m
n
  ⇡d +
1X
t=2
 t 1⇡c,
iff.      ⇤ = ⇡
d   ⇡mn
⇡d   ⇡c .
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4.1 Minimum Purchase Clauses
The stability of the buyer group arrangement depends on the temptation of retailers to cheat on their
input market and to secretly negotiate additional wholesale contracts outside of the buyer group
arrangement—just like the stability of standard output market collusion depends on the temptation
to cheat on the output market and undercut rivals.
A retailer negotiating an additional unobservable contract outside of the buyer group arrange-
ment, with a wholesale price lower than wm, gains a competitive advantage over its rivals in the
subsequent competition stage, because rivals are supplied at wm. The optimal additional contract
a deviant retailer negotiates prescribes a wholesale price equal to marginal cost,
(w, ⌧) = (c, 0) ,
which allows the deviant retailer to price below pm or increase final output above qm in the compe-
tition stage.
Minimum purchase clauses oblige retailers to source a minimum quantity of inputs through the
buyer group at wholesale price wm, which makes secret negotiation of an additional contract outside
of the buyer group arrangement less profitable. That is, the deviant retailer cannot buy its entire
deviant quantity outside of the buyer group arrangement at the lower wholesale price c, but only
the amount the deviant retailer produces on top of the amount dictated by the minimum purchase
clause.
Such a deviation is detected by rival retailers through observing the competitive outcome on the
output market. That is, they would observe that the deviant retailer produces more outputs, i.e.
sources more inputs, than would be expected at wholesale price wm.
Proposition 2 When contracts can specify minimum purchase provisions, the buyer group optimally
negotiates contracts specifying (wm, ⌧m), as well as a minimum purchase clause of qm. Retailers
then jointly extract monopoly profits, and the buyer group arrangement is stable for the same set of
discount factors for which standard output market collusion is stable,
 ⇤bg =  
⇤.
Proof. Denote by q¯ the minimum purchase quantity. In the profit maximising equilibrium, each
retailer produces qm and therefore the group strictly prefers to set q¯  qm. The optimal contract
that a retailer is able to secretly negotiate outside of the buyer group arrangement is (w, ⌧) = (c, 0).
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Restricted by the quantity clause, the defecting retailer is obliged to source an amount q¯ through
the buyer group at marginal cost wm, and can only source incremental amounts outside of the buyer
group arrangement at marginal cost c. Therefore, noting that the deviating retailer will only produce
qi   q¯, it sets qi or pi to solve, respectively,
⇡dbg = maxqi
qip
✓
n  1
n
Qm + qi
◆
  (q¯wm + (qi   q¯) c)  ⌧m, or (4)
⇡dbg = maxpi
qi
 
pi,p
m
 i
 
pi  
 
q¯wm +
 
qi
 
pi,p
m
 i
   q¯  c   ⌧m. (5)
We have
@⇡dbg
@q¯ < 0, and therefore the optimal minimum purchase quantity is q¯ = q
m, which gives
⇡dbg = ⇡
d by simplifying (4) and (5), because ⌧m =   (wm   c) qm. Again, the per-period profit
earned by participating in the buyer group is ⇡m/n, while the profit decreases to ⇡c in periods
following defection. As a result, the buyer group induced monopoly outcome is stable if and only if
⇡m
(1   )n   ⇡
d +
 ⇡c
1    ,
iff.      ⇤bg =
⇡d   ⇧mn
⇡d   ⇡c =  
⇤.
The buyer group arrangement is now as stable as standard collusion, because the deviation profits
are equal in both cases. The intuition is that the deviant retailer negotiates a contract outside of the
group arrangement with a wholesale price of c, which is the same wholesale price a deviant retailer
would face in the case of conventional collusion. As a result, the ‘marginal condition’ is equal in
both cases, leading to the same deviation output or price. This in turn leads to the same deviation
profits, since although the buyer group contract specifies a wholesale price wm > c on the first qm
units, the difference is refunded through the slotting allowance and thus has no net effect on total
deviation profits.
4.2 No Additional Clauses
Consider the case of simple two-part tariff contracts without the option to sign additional clauses.
Again, we allow retailers to unobservably deviate from the buyer group by secretly signing additional
wholesale contracts, and examine the stability of the arrangement. Such a deviation would be
detected by rival retailers through observing the competitive outcome on the output market, because
the deviant retailer produces more outputs, i.e. sources more inputs, than would be expected
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at wholesale price wm. The following proposition states that, in such a case, the buyer group
arrangement is less stable than standard output market collusion.
Proposition 3 Without the possibility of committing to vertical restraints, if retailers are patient
enough, the buyer group induces the joint monopoly outcome through wholesale contracts specifying
(wm, ⌧m). The buyer group arrangement is less stable than standard output market collusion,
 ⇤bg >  
⇤.
Proof. The per-period profit earned by participating in the buyer group is ⇡m/n, while the profit
decreases to ⇡c in periods following defection from the common arrangement. Because now the
buyer group has no minimum purchase requirement, the deviating retailer sources all of his inputs
through the supplier he secretly negotiated with instead of through the buyer group contract, because
c < wm. In case of quantity or price competition, the deviating retailer sets qi or pi so as to solve,
respectively,
⇡dbg = maxqi
qi
✓
p
✓
n  1
n
Qm + qi
◆
  c
◆
  ⌧m, or (6)
⇡dbg = maxpi
qi
 
pi,p
m
 i
 
(pi   c)  ⌧m.
The retailer that secretly negotiated an additional contract effectively faces the same optimisation
problem as a retailer that deviates from tacit collusion – compare for example (3) and (6). These
equations are identical except for the slotting allowance term, that is, ⇡dbg = ⇡
d   ⌧m. The slotting
allowance is fixed (sunk) and therefore has no impact on the optimal deviation strategy: a retailer
deviating from the buyer group arrangement sets the same price or quantity as a retailer deviating
from standard output market collusion. As a result, the buyer group is stable if and only if
⇡m
(1   )n   ⇡
d   ⌧m +  ⇡
c
1    ,
iff.      ⇤bg =
⇡d   ⌧m   ⇡mn
⇡d   ⌧m   ⇡c >  
⇤,
because ⌧m < 0 (the fixed fee is a slotting allowance).
The intuition for this result is that the deviant retailer not only earns an amount ⇡d by sourcing
through a different supplier; this retailer also receives the slotting allowance prescribed in the buyer
group contract. In other words, sticking to the buyer group strategy gives a payoff equal to the
conventional collusive payoff, while negotiating an additional contract outside of the buyer group
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arrangement gives the ‘collusive deviating payoff’ plus the slotting allowance. The temptation to
deviate from the buyer group arrangement is thus higher than the temptation to deviate from
conventional collusion.
Deviation by sourcing an amount qd outside of the buyer group arrangement is detected by
rival retailers through observing the competitive outcome on the output market. Now consider the
following type of deviation: the deviant retailer buys the amount qm at wholesale price c outside
of the buyer group arrangement. Again, the deviant retailer would increase its earnings, because it
sources at price c instead of wm, while still receiving the slotting allowance ⌧m. Such a deviation
would not be observable on the output market as the volume of outputs produced is qm. However,
deviating by sourcing amount qm through a different supplier is dominated by deviating by sourcing
amount qd, because (i) it is less profitable, because deviating with an amount qm gives a lower
payoff than deviating with the optimal amount qd, and (ii) it is still detected by other buyer group
members since the deviant retailer does not source any inputs centrally through the buyer group.
In the next section, we show that such a deviation is unprofitable altogether in the case of rebate
schemes instead of slotting allowances.
4.3 Rebate Schemes
In the analysis so far, we have assumed that the payment of the (negative) fixed fee is not contingent
on the volume of purchases. We now relax this assumption and allow for rebate schemes, i.e. payment
of the fixed fee depends on the volume of inputs purchased. These rebates are paid retroactively
after all inputs have been purchased. Let subscript ‘rs’ denote the case in which the buyer group
contract allows for rebate schemes.
Proposition 4 When contracts can specify that the fixed fee can be paid as a rebate, the buyer group
optimally negotiates contracts specifying (wm, ⌧m), where ⌧m is paid if and only if the retailer sources
at least qm units of inputs through the buyer group contract. Retailers then jointly extract monopoly
profits, and the buyer group arrangement is stable for the same set of discount factors for which
standard output market collusion is stable,
 ⇤bg =  
⇤.
Proof. The contract that allows retailers to extract joint monopoly profits on the output market
is still (wm, ⌧m), while the optimal contract that a retailer is able to secretly negotiate outside of
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the buyer group arrangement is (w, ⌧) = (c, 0). Denote by q¯rs the volume of inputs that must be
purchased through the buyer group in order to receive the rebate ⌧m.
There are two ways for a buyer group member to deviate: (i) sourcing an amount q¯rs against
unit cost wm through the buyer group, thereby receiving the rebate ⌧m, while sourcing an amount
qi   q¯rs outside of the buyer group against unit cost c, or (ii) sourcing the full amount qi outside of
the buyer group against unit cost c without receiving the rebate.
The first type of deviation gives deviating profit ⇡drs = ⇡dbg as in expressions (4) and (5) with q¯
replaced by q¯rs. Noting that retailers strictly prefer q¯rs  qm (otherwise the rebate may incentivise
retailers to produce more than the monopoly output), and that @⇡
d
rs
@q¯rs
< 0, we have that optimally
the buyer group sets the rebate threshold at q¯rs = qm. This then means that ⇡drs = ⇡d.
In the second type of deviation, the deviant retailer sets qi or pi to solve, respectively,
⇡dbg = maxqi
qip
✓
n  1
n
Qm + qi
◆
  qic, or
⇡dbg = maxpi
qi
 
pi,p
m
 i
 
pi   qi
 
pi,p
m
 i
 
c,
which is equivalent to equations (3). Therefore, we again have that ⇡drs = ⇡d. Thus, both types of
deviation give the same deviating profit.
Since the per-period profit earned by participating in the buyer group is ⇡m/n, while the profit
decreases to ⇡c in periods following defection, the buyer group induced monopoly outcome is stable
if and only if
     ⇤bg =
⇡d   ⇧mn
⇡d   ⇡c =  
⇤.
Thus, rebate schemes—instead of slotting allowances—in the input market also allow retailers to
achieve the monopoly outcome in the output market. The difference between rebates and slotting
allowances is that rebates are paid after the purchase of inputs (conditionally dependent of the
purchased volume), while slotting allowances are paid before the purchase of inputs (independent of
the purchased volume). Now, deviating can take two forms: (i) sourcing just enough inputs through
the buyer group so as to receive the rebate, while sourcing the remaining inputs outside of the buyer
group at lower input cost c, or (ii) sourcing the entire deviating quantity outside of the buyer group.
Since the optimal rebate threshold is qm, the first type of deviation entails the same deviating
payoff as with minimum purchase clauses, from which we already know that its stability is the same
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as that of a standard output market cartel. With the second type of deviation, the deviant retailer
sources all of its inputs outside of the buyer group arrangement at unit cost c without receiving the
rebate, which also gives the same deviating payoff as that of a standard output cartel. Hence, rebate
schemes allows the stability of the anticompetitive buyer group to be restored to  ⇤.
Note that the type of deviation discussed in the last paragraph of the previous subsection is
unprofitable with rebate schemes. That is, deviating by sourcing qm outside of the buyer group at
wholesale price c results in the rebate ⌧m not being paid out. Thus, deviation gives the same profit
in the current (deviation) period as sticking to the equilibrium strategy, i.e. qm (pm   c) = ⇡mn ,
while resulting in Nash punishment in future periods.
4.4 Buyer Group Specific Cost Savings: Stability and Welfare
So far, we have assumed that there are no monetary benefits from centrally sourcing through the
buyer group. However, buyer group specific cost savings—(possibly) caused by central sourcing—
are an important rationale for forming a buyer group.16 Such cost savings not only affect the buyer
group’s stability, but also has implications for (consumer) welfare.17
Suppose the buyer group generates efficiencies in marginal cost, such as a reduction in the variable
part of transportation or transaction costs, or more generally, savings through bulk ordering and scale
economies. These cost efficiencies would increase the buyer group’s stability for two reasons. First,
defection becomes relatively less profitable, because the deviant retailer does not enjoy cost savings
when sourcing from a supplier outside of the buyer group arrangement. Second, Nash punishment
after defection is relatively fiercer, because no cost efficiencies are realised during punishment. The
larger the cost savings, the larger are these two effects. As a result, the buyer group becomes more
stable as cost savings are larger, and becomes stable against cheating for all discount factors if cost
savings are sufficiently large.
Retailers always benefit from establishing a buyer group, because they profit from both the
“cartelization effect” and the “cost savings effect”. Whether consumers also benefit from the buyer
group, and by how much, depends on the relative importance of the pass-through of cost efficiencies
compared to the anticompetitive “cartelization effect”. While collusion tends to increase price (or:
reduce output), cost savings tend to increase price (or: reduce output). Consumers, thus, benefit
16For example, the Floral Buyer Group claims to realise cost savings through more efficient transportation and
storage of flowers, while the Aidelade Buyers Group saves on overheads by jointly purchasing power components.
17We describe the driving forces qualitatively; a technical exposition of the arguments in the Cournot model with
linear demand is available online at carteltheory.com/buyergroupefficiencies.
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from the anticompetitive buyer group if and only if the pass-on of cost savings outweighs the collusion
effect. Therefore, a buyer group that serves to extract cartel rents on the output market may actually
be welfare-enhancing for consumers compared to the fully competitive benchmark.18
5 Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks
Buyer groups play an important role across a wide range of sectors in the economy. They may
facilitate pro-competitive forces based on buyer power considerations, acting to reduce wholesale
prices and level the playing field between smaller firms and larger firms that can exercise buyer
power unilaterally, which is potentially to the benefit of final consumers. We instead develop a
model of a strictly anticompetitive effect of buyer groups in markets where wholesale contracting
is unobservable. A buyer group allows its members to credibly commit to wholesale contracts
that induce joint monopoly profits in the downstream market. We show that commonly observed
vertical restraints and contracting terms – exclusivity provisions, minimum purchase clauses, and
rebate schemes – enhance the stability of the buyer group by effectively limiting retailers’ ability or
incentives to defect from the arrangement.
Our findings contribute to the growing debate both among academics and practitioners on the
competitive effects of buyer groups, and what the appropriate approach by regulators should be to
dealing with such arrangements, which are not per se illegal under either US antitrust law or EU
competition law. This discussion has traditionally mirrored that which surrounds the issue of buyer
power more generally. By enabling firms to exercise countervailing power over their suppliers, a
buyer group can allow its members to obtain lower input prices, a significant proportion of which
may be passed onto consumers in the form of lower retail prices, provided that there is effective
retail competition (Inderst and Mazzarotto, 2007). On the other hand, it has been argued that the
exercise of buyer power could potentially result in waterbed effects, resulting in rival buyers being
charged higher prices or being offered inferior quality inputs (Majumdar, 2006, Inderst and Valletti,
2009).
Furthermore, buyer groups can potentially serve to level the playing field between firms down-
stream, by allowing smaller buyers access to the same terms of trade that larger buyers have access
to. Finally, and of most relevance to our findings, buyers groups can have implications for the
18Reductions in fixed costs would also increase the buyer group’s stability by the two reasons mentioned above.
Consumer welfare would be unaltered, however, as fixed costs are sunk and do not affect the retailers’ behavior on
the output market. See the last paragraph of Section 5 for more discussion.
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potential for tacit collusion between members. For example, the group arrangement may result in
the sharing of information between firms or may serve to increase the degree of symmetry between
members, thereby possibly facilitating collusion (see UK Office of Fair Trading, 2007).
Our findings have highlighted additional factors that policy makers must be aware of when dealing
with buyer groups. If buyer groups act as ‘implied cartels’, they may be mistakenly identified as
pro-competitive forces, with retailers arguing that a buyer group allows them to secure discounts
from suppliers, which can then be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices. In our model,
retailers may use the high slotting allowances paid by the suppliers in equilibrium as ‘evidence’ of
the buyer group being a pro-competitive organisation acting to reduce input prices. We therefore
caution policy makers assessing the impact of a buyer group to be careful when interpreting evidence
on input prices, and to recognise that high slotting fees will likely not result in enhanced downstream
competition (as they are fixed payments) and that they may be paid in response to higher wholesale
prices, which explicitly reduce downstream competition.
A further key issue for policy makers which our conclusions highlight relates to the fact that an
anticompetitive buyer group is likely to be harder to detect than standard forms of output market
collusion, such as (tacitly) raising prices. An antitrust authority investigating the output market
may not be able to find evidence of anticompetitive behaviour if the retailers use a buyer group to
jointly expropriate monopoly profits. An analysis of, for example, price-cost mark-ups would find
no evidence of firms pricing above competitive levels if the retailers’ costs are taken as given. It may
be a significant step for the antitrust authority to expand the analysis of suspected retailer collusion
to include an examination of the process of wholesale contracting between retailers and suppliers in
the upstream market, but our work highlights that this may indeed be necessary.19
Our work also contributes to the continuing policy debate regarding vertical restraints. Inter-
estingly, in our model such restraints are not imposed on buyers by powerful suppliers in order to
extract profits or exclude upstream rivals, but are willingly entered into by retailers themselves as
a means by which they can jointly credibly commit to purchasing from the buyer group at higher
wholesale prices. Our findings therefore caution against possible anti-competitive effects when ver-
tical restraints are observed in such circumstances. In the model, we explicitly considered exclusive
dealing and minimum purchase clauses, as well as rebate schemes, but similar results would be ob-
19For example, the EC imposed fines on five firms active in the Spanish raw tobacco industry as it concluded that
purchasing quotas were effectively targets for market shares in the downstream market (Case COMP/C.38.238/B.2 –
Raw Tobacco Spain, 2004).
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tained through the use of retail price maintenance (RPM). Then, retailers could coordinate their
wholesale contracts to include RPM clauses that prevent them from pricing below the monopoly
price on the output market.
Similar effects may be expected to arise from other restraints which serve to encourage buyers to
purchase from a single supplier, such as input joint ventures and franchising. As for joint ventures,
Priest (1977) and Chen and Ross (2003) show that an industry-wide joint venture, where its members
are charged per-unit royalties, functions similarly as a buyer group with slotting allowances. The
joint venture may set per-unit royalties on the input market high enough such that the monopoly
outcome is realised on the output market, while sharing the joint venture’s profit among the retailers,
resulting in joint monopoly profits being realised. Also, franchising is often organised as a buyer
group (Blair and Lafontaine, 2005), allowing for the same anticompetitive effects as an ‘implied
cartel’.
However, we also note that even when the cartelization effect we identify is present, it cannot be
interpreted in isolation from all of the other issues which surround buyer groups. We demonstrated
that even when a buyer group serves to expropriate joint monopoly profits on the output market,
consumers can still be better off when this effect is outweighed by efficiency savings which then
actually result in lower retail prices. Therefore, the effect we identify must be considered alongside
other evidence on how such groups affect the relationship between buyers and sellers, and competition
in the downstream market.
As well as demonstrating that buyer groups can potentially facilitate explicit collusion, our work
also serves to highlight the conditions under which this is likely to be a concern. Primarily, in
exchange for the higher wholesale prices that buyers pay they must receive lump sum slotting fees
in return, otherwise it would be the suppliers that expropriated the monopoly rents and the buyers
would actually be worse off. In practice, this need not be an explicit ‘slotting fee’, but could for
example be presented as a ‘marketing allowance’ or an end of year rebate; and in principle it does not
even need to be an explicit monetary payment; for example, the supplier could pass on technological
knowhow or superior training methods of equal value. Secondly, an anticompetitive buyer group
arrangement is much more likely to successfully arise when the membership of the group in question
consists of all of the firms in the market. If many firms remain outside of the group, they would
likely be able to undercut the higher retail prices offered by the group members (or increase output
to make up for their restriction), and would therefore deter the group from attempting to undertake
such a cost-raising arrangement in the first place.
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As a final note, we argued in Section 4.4 that efficiencies in marginal costs generated through
the buyer group increase its stability, and may even benefit consumers. Other advantages of buyer
groups, such as a reduction in fixed costs or the exercise of buyer power, would similarly stabilise the
anticompetitive mechanism. The impact on consumers and welfare would again depend on the nature
and pass-through of those advantages to consumers. For example, if the exercise of buyer power
leads to increased product quality, consumers benefit in the sense that they consume a superior
product than they otherwise would. On the other hand, while a buyer group specific reduction
in fixed costs would increase the group’s stability, consumers would in no way benefit since fixed
costs do not affect the competitive outcome in the output market. Thus, the welfare effects of an
anticompetitive buyer group critically depend on the type of efficiencies created, and how these
tradeoff against the cartelization effect. However, although buyer groups may generate efficiencies
that are to the benefit of final consumers, our work indicates that exclusive dealing and minimum
purchase contracts negotiated through buyer groups, in combination with slotting allowances, or the
use of rebate schemes, may be worthy of closer scrutiny by regulators.
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